Thursday, 22 August 2019

United Airlines Tracked a Different Flight 93 Than the FAA

By Mark Conlon 


It is revealed by ACARS radio messages that Flight 93 was lost over Illinois


ACARS (Aircraft Conditioning and Reporting System) is the basic radio-based tool for communication between an aircraft and its company. On 9/11, United Airlines flight dispatchers sent several ACARS text messages to the planes they were responsible for, including Flight 93 and Flight 175.

On January 28, 2002, Michael J. Winter of United Airlines was interviewed by the FBI to help them with the interpretation of the ACARS messages. The full FBI report is appended at the end of this article and can also be looked here (scroll down to the very last interview):
http://www.911myths.com/images/1/1c/Team7_Box11_FBI302s_ACARS.pdf

The actual content of the messages is already known and hardly interesting ("beware cockpit intrusion" etc.), but what makes them toxic for the official story is the plane's approximate position that is attached to each message:

Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations (RGS) at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.

In other words: if the message denotes (for example) PIT, this means that the Pittsburgh RGS has received the strongest signal and that the plane is in the vicinity of Pittsburgh (usually up to 70 miles, depending on the distance to other RGS's).

Now these positional pieces of information reveal shocking news: Winter explicitly confirms that United 93 received the last ACARS messages when it was near Fort Wayne (Indiana) and, some minutes later, near Champaign (Illinois):

Messages #16 and #17 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Ft. Wayne, IN, FWA as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL FWA...". The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #18 and #19 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Champaign, IL CMI as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL CMI...". Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19 also activated an audible signal in the aircraft.

The original ACARS messages can be found here:
http://www.911myths.com/images/8/82/Team7_Box13_UAL_ACARS.pdf

Not all of the messages enumerated by Winter are listed in the file, but messages #16-#19 are, together with the time when they were received. So it's possible to establish a rough flight path for United 93:

9:22 PIT (Pittsburgh)
9:32 CAK (Canton/Akron)
9:36 CLE (Cleveland)
9:47 TOL (Toledo)
9:51 FWY (Fort Wayne, IN)
10:10 CMI (Champaign, IL)

After Champaign, no message was received by United 93 anymore.

The authenticity of the ACARS messages is beyond doubt. The proper interpretation has been delivered by Michael J. Winter and confirmed by David Knerr, Manager Flight Dispatch Automation, United Airlines. The flight path is consistent with the speed of a commercial airliner (keeping in mind that the plane is up to 70 miles away from the respective radio station), and the tail number of the plane that received the messages was N591UA: United 93.

Does that mean that the official flight path, with United 93 making a U turn over Cleveland, is faked? No, not at all. The U turn is confirmed multiple times by air traffic control radio messages and personal statements from Cleveland Center controllers. I will take a closer look at these sources and their relation to the RADES radar data in forthcoming blog entries. I can already promise that this checkup will further damage the credibility of the RADES files.

In my past research, I have uncovered the duplication of several planes involved in 9/11, but the case of Flight 93 over Illinois is the strongest one due to the authentic power of the ACARS messages. The Flight 93 that was tracked by United Airlines was a different plane than the Flight 93 that was tracked by the FAA.

In this blog entry, I already have presented evidence that Flight 93 was duplicated right from the start. Also note the same dichotomy at Logan Airport: According to ACARS, Flight 175 took off at 8:28. According to the FAA, Flight 175 took off at 8:43.

A pattern emerges...

Appendix - FBI summary of the interview with Michael J. Winter

On January 28, 2002, Michael J. Winter was interviewed at United Airlines UAL, World Headquarters, 1200 E. Algonquin Road, Elk Grove Village, IL. The interviewing Agent identified himself to Mr. Winter and told him, the interview concerned UAL flight 93 on September 11, 2001 and the communications between UAL flight 93 and the flight dispatchers. Mr. Winter voluntarily provided the following information regarding these communications.

In reviewing the Sanitized Time and Text of ACARS messages as provided by the FBI, Mr. Winter said Message #1 was from the aircraft to UAL Dispatch. Message #2 was to the aircraft from UAL Dispatch at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, NY and Message #3 was to the aircraft from UAL flight dispatcher ED BALLINGER. Message #4 was from the aircraft to UAL flight dispatcher ED BALLINGER. Message #5, listed as unreadable, was engine data advisory information. Message #6 was from UAL flight dispatcher A.D. "Sandy " ROGERS to the aircraft and Message #7 was from UAL flight dispatcher ROBERT BRITTAIN to the aircraft.

Message #8 was to the aircraft from BALLINGER and Message #9, listed as unreadable, was the engine data advisory information. Message #10 was from UAL flight Dispatcher CHAD McCURDY to the aircraft. Except for Message #13, which was to the aircraft from UAL San Francisco Maintenance, DAVID PRICE, all of the other messages listed were from UAL flight dispatcher BALLINGER.

Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations RGS at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.

Message #1 was routed from the aircraft through the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA PIT as designated in the line "DT DDL PIT...". Message #2, to the aircraft, was also routed through the RGS near Pittsburgh, A and was directed to the ACARS printer on the aircraft. The routing to the printer is designated by the letters "AGM" following "Smi=AGM" and "STX=AGM.."

Message #3 was a message to the aircraft from Chicago Dispatch CHIDD listed as a Command Response MD type message. The CMD message, designated in the line "Smi=CMD Agy/Num=65535", was sent to the ACARS screen and utilized the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA. In this type of message, the flight dispatcher can also activate an audible signal to alert the flight crew of the sent message but this was not done.

Message #4 was sent from the aircraft to UAL flight dispatch using the RGS near Pittsburgh, PA. The designation "C4" appears just before the sentence "EWRSFO" indicating the message was sent from the aircraft.

Message #5 was an engine data message which was sent automatically to UAL Chicago dispatch and a UAL maintenance computer. The information in the message as N41.20 W080.5" was the latitude and longitude of the aircraft when the date was sent.

Message #6 was a message to the aircraft from CHIDD using a RGS near Akron/Canton, OH CAK and was sent to the ACARS screen. The designation for Akron/Canton, OH CAK appears in the line beginning "AN N591UA/GL CAK"

Message #7 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using a RGS near Akron/Canton, OH. The message was sent to the ACARS screen and was a CMD type message.

Message #8 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Akron/Canton, OH. The message was a CMD message and also activated the audible signal. The audible signal designated as "BEL" in the line "QUCHIAKUA-1-BL>UA 93".

Message #9 was an engine data message. The latitude and longitude was also listed in the message as "N41.31 W081.06".

Message #10 was sent to the aircraft from CHIDD and was sent to the ACARS screen only. The RGS in this instance was near Cleveland, OH CLE from the line "AN N591UA/GL CLE".

Messages #11 and #12 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Cleveland, OH. These messages also activated the audible signal in the aircraft.

Message #13 was sent to the aircraft from UAL San Francisco, CA line maintenance to the ACARS screen and also activated the audible signal. The RGS for this message was near Toledo, OH as designated "TOL" in the one "AN N591UA/GL TOL".

Messages #14 and #15 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Toledo, OH. The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #16 and #17 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Ft. Wayne, IN, FWA as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL FWA". The messages were sent to the ACARS printer.

Messages #18 and #19 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD using the RGS near Champaign, IL CMI as designated in the line "AN N591UA/GL CMI". Both messages were sent to the printer and Message #19 also activated an audible signal in the aircraft.

Messages #20 to #24 were sent to the aircraft from CHIDD. However, all of the messages were rejected indicating the aircraft did not receive them.

Also present during part of this interview was David Knerr, Manager Flight Dispatch Automation, UAL WHQ.


Thanks for reading & caring! 


United Flight 175 Was Duplicated: Three Pieces of Evidence

By Mark Conlon

 


DDLXCXA CHIAK CH158R
.CHIAKUA DA 111323/ED
CMD
AN N612UA/GL PIT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
/BEWARE ANY COCKPIT INTROUSION: TWO AIRCAFT IN NY . HIT TRADE C
NTER BUILDS...
CHIDD ED BALLINGER
;09111323 108575 0574

As I've shown in this blog entry, the ACARS radio messages sent from United Airlines dispatchers to Flight 93 are clear evidence that the plane was over Fort Wayne, Indiana and later Champaign, Illinois when it received its last messages. This doesn't mean that the "official" Flight 93 which turned around over Cleveland didn't exist; there is plenty of FAA material showing that it did exist. Hence the conclusion that United Airlines tracked a different Flight 93 than the FAA is inevitable - a case for duplicated planes and 9/11 being an Operation Northwoods-like maneuver.

Likewise, United dispatchers sent ACARS messages to Flight 175 locating it near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania just when the South Tower was hit (by whatever plane) and near Pittsburgh 20 minutes later. Hence the Flight 175 that was tracked by United Airlines was not identical to the plane that hit the South Tower.

Before featuring the ACARS messages in particular, I'd like to repeat why it's possible to deduce the approximate position of a plane by means of the transmitting ground station that is attached to each message:

Mr. Winter explained the Aircraft Condition and Reporting System ACARS uses radio ground stations (RGS) at various locations throughout the United States for communication. The messages from the aircraft utilize the RGS in a downlink operating system. A central router determines the strongest signal received from the aircraft and routes the signal/message to UAL flight dispatch.
http://www.911myths.com/images/1/1c/Team7_Box11_FBI302s_ACARS.pdf

In other words: if the message denotes (for example) PIT, this means that the Pittsburgh RGS has received the strongest signal and that the plane is in the vicinity of Pittsburgh (usually up to 70 miles, depending on the distance to other RGS's). A map of the RGS's of the relevant part of the United States is here:

Now to the ACARS messages. They have generously been scanned and published by Mike Williams of 911myths.com: http://www.911myths.com/images/8/82/Team7_Box13_UAL_ACARS.pdf

I have transcribed them and added brief comments. The crucial pieces of information are highlighted in red. The last three letters in the fourth line denote the active RGS, and the last line denotes the date and time which is given in zulu format (09111259 = September 11th, 8:59 EDT).

At 8:59, United aircraft maintenance employee Jerry Tsen sent an ACARS message to Flight 175 via the radio ground station MDT (Harrisburg), indicating that the plane was near Harrisburg, not New York.

DDLXCXA SFOLM CHI58R SFOFRSAM
.SFOLMUA 111259/JER
CMD
AN N612UA/GL MDT
- QUSFOLMUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
I HEARD OF A REPORTED INCIDENT ABOARD YOUR ACFT. PLZ VERIFY ALLIS NORMAL....THX 777SAM
SFOLM JERRY TSEN
;09111259 108575 0543

At 9:03, United flight dispatcher Ed Ballinger sent an ACARS message to Flight 175 when it was still in the vicinity of Harrisburg - exactly when another plane (later believed to be Flight 175) crashed into the WTC South Tower:

DDLXCXA CHIAK CH158R
.CHIAKUA 111303/ED
CMD
AN N612UA/GL MDT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
HOW IS THE RIDE. ANY THING DISPATCH CAN DO FOR YOU...
CHIDD ED BALLINGER
;09111303 108575 0545

Also, at 9:03, United flight dispatcher Sandy Rogers sent another ACARS message to Flight 175.

 DDLXCXA CHIYR CH158R
.CHIYRUA 111303/AD
CMD
AN N612UA/GL MDT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
NY APROACH LOOKIN FOR YA ON 127.4
CHIDD AD ROGERS
;09111303 108575 0546

Finally, at 9:23, Ed Ballinger sent the last ACARS message to Flight 175. The message was received while the plane was near Pittsburgh (PIT). This was 20 minutes after the South Tower was hit.

DDLXCXA CHIAK CH158R
.CHIAKUA DA 111323/ED
CMD
AN N612UA/GL PIT
- QUCHIYRUA 1UA175 BOSLAX
- MESSAGE FROM CHIDD -
/BEWARE ANY COCKPIT INTROUSION: TWO AIRCAFT IN NY . HIT TRADE C
NTER BUILDS...
CHIDD ED BALLINGER
;09111323 108575 0574

The existence of the "official" Flight 175 is undoubtedly substantiated by FAA documents (ATC/pilot transcripts etc.) So like Flight 93, United Airlines tracked a different Flight 175 than the FAA. Another case of plane duplication. And for Flight 175 there is strong additional evidence that the plane was duplicated from start:

-two planes identifiable as United 175 took off from Logan ; one at 8:14 (the official one) and one at 8:23 (this one with tail number N612UA).

We also have the impossible phone call from United 175: Peter Hanson, who was aboard the plane, called his father Lee Hanson at 9:00:03 through a satellite-based GTE airphone. The call lasted 192 seconds, hence ending at 9:03:15, 4 seconds after a plane later believed to be Flight 175 hit the South Tower (9:03:11, according to seismic data). With the detection of a second Flight 175, the phone call suddenly makes sense.

Disregarding the ACARS messages, the recordings of GTE phone calls, and the statement of US Airways pilot Steven Miller who observed United 175 taking off from Boston just before himself, is not an option.

The alternative explanation is straightforward and yields a consistent flight path: United 175, tail number N612UA, took off from Boston at 8:23. Peter Hanson talked with his father from 9:00 to 9:03 when the plane was in the skies over Harrisburg. It continued to fly westbound und was near Pittsburgh when it received its last message at 9:23. It is not clear yet what happened to this United 175 afterwards.

It is clear, however, that the "official" United 175 tracked by the FAA was a different plane. The research will continue.

Thanks for reading & caring!


Friday, 2 August 2019

Two United Airlines "Flight 175" Taking-off From Boston Logan Airport On 9/11: CONFIRMED

By Mark Conlon


In the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) database reveals a strange discrepancy regarding the "wheels-off time" of Flight 175. This is the moment when the plane lifts off from the runway. The BTS notes a wheels-off time of 8:23 a.m., which differs distinctly from the "official" wheels-off time, which is 8:14 a.m. http://www.bts.gov/xml/ontimesummarystatistics/src/dstat/OntimeSummaryDepatures.xml


This 8:14 a.m. take-off is confirmed by the Air Traffic Control (ATC) pilot radio transcript and various radar data. So, what about the 8:23 a.m.? How was this data generated?

The wheels-off time of is triggered automatically by a mechanical switcher when the plane loses contact to the ground. The data is sent automatically to the airline via Aircraft Communication Addressing Radio System (ACARS), and the airline forwards them to the BTS on a regular base. So no human failure is possible. The fact that the gate departure 7:58 a.m. coincides with the official story suggests that the data is valid.

Being familiar with the duplication of Flight 11 at Logan Airport, I arrived at the conclusion that this was another case of a duplicated plane, with "Flight 175" taking-off at 8:14 a.m. and another "Flight 175" taking off at 8:23 a.m. http://pilotsfor911truth.org/forum//index.php?showtopic=29

To support the 8:23 a.m. take-off time of the duplicate Flight 175, I identified a surprising  eyewitness, who is named Steven Miller who is a pilot of US Airways, and was next in line behind Flight 175 to take-off from the runway on 9/11.

On the taxi-out in Boston, Steven Miller (the pilots of US Airways 6805) waited at the runway's hold-short line, where Miller looked up to watch a United Boeing 767 take-off, (United Flight 175). The final weight and balance calculations from dispatch came over the ACARS at 8:05 a.m., and with that in hand, the crew was ready to fly. Wide-body aircraft produce especially powerful wingtip vortices - horizontal, tornado-like winds off the ends of the wings - which require time to dissipate before another aircraft can take-off, so Miller waited the required three minutes after United Flight 175 departed before he received his take-off clearance.
Source: (Lynn Spencer, "Touching History", p. 58)

A quick check with the BTS database reveals that USA 6805 had a wheels-off time of 8:28 a.m. Miller explicitly describes that he waited 3 minutes before getting take-off clearance; adding a little bit for the timespan between take-off clearance and actual wheels-off, Flight 175 must have lifted off the runway around 8:23-8:24 a.m. It is out of the question that Miller observed a plane that took-off at 8:14 a.m.

The question has to asked; Did Miller see a different United plane? This is very unlikely. Searching the BTS database for other United Boeing 767's delivers no results for the relevant time. There is a very slim possibility that a non-domestic United Boeing 767 took-off just then, because the BTS database lists only domestic flights. However, Miller himself says it was Flight 175, so either he overheard the flight number when taxiing out, or, as someone who was frequently flying from Logan (as he says) he was familiar with the wide-body planes departing at that time.

The BTS database also reveals that the tail number of the plane that took-off at 8:23 a.m. was N612UA. This was United Airlines Flight 175. And there is no proof that the plane that took-off at 8:14 a.m. was N612UA.

Thanks for reading & caring!


Monday, 24 June 2019

Revealing Facts About Simon (Shack) Hytten's Background

By Mark Conlon

In September 2013 I posted a blog showing how Markus Allen (a 'video fakery' promoter) put-out a video claiming the Michael Hezarkhani video had a CGI glitch contained in it, when the airplane's wing passed behind a building in the foreground. This turned-out to be false, and I demonstrated why in this blog post. Following-on in January and July 2014, I also wrote two more blogs showing how Markus Allen's other two claims were false about the Michael Hezarkhani video, where he claimed buildings were missing, in the video and the location where Michael Hezarkhani took his video didn't exist. I demonstrated thoroughly how this was not true.



In this revealing exchange between Markus Allen and Simon (Shack) Hytten, the maker of the September Clues film 2007-8, in the interview he admits to having done work for the European Space Agency. This is revealing because of other interesting family members connections they have. For example, Shack's brother Mario, was a racing car driver and was sponsored by the brother of Osama Bin Laden, and Shack's father worked for the United Nations (UN). Is this just a coincidence? The interview can be found here: 
https://www.bitchute.com/video/qTCxMpWiL1ah/

Sunday, 30 December 2018

No Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs) Activated When the Four Planes Crashed on 9/11

By Mark Conlon 


The Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELT) are emergency transmitters that are carried aboard most general aviation aircraft in the U.S. In the event of an aircraft accident, these devices are designed to transmit a distress signal on 121.5 and 243.0 MHz frequencies. ELTs are mounted in the airplane, and designed to be triggered upon impact. Activation of the ELT triggers an audio alert, and 406-MHz ELTs transmit GPS position for search and rescue. [Emergency Locator Transmitters – AOPA]. https://www.aopa.org/advocacy/aircraft/aircraft-operations/emergency-locator-transmitters


According to the 9/11 Commission, AAL 11 crashed into the North Tower at 8:46 a.m. [The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004, p. 7.] However, two and a half minutes earlier, David Bottiglia, an air traffic controller at the FAA's New York Center, received an important message from one of the planes in the airspace he was monitoring. At 8:44 a.m. the pilot of U.S. Airways Flight 583 told Bottiglia: "I just picked up an ELT on 121.5. It was brief, but it went off." (121.5 megahertz is an emergency frequency that ELTs are designed to transmit their distress signals on.) A minute later, about 90 second before AAL 11 crashed into the WTC another plane in the New York Center's airspace reported the same thing. The pilot of Delta Airlines Flight 2433 told Bottiglia: "We picked up that ELT, too. But it's very faint." [Transcript of United Airlines Flight 175] - https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/16/national/transcript-of-united-airlines-flight-175.html 

According to author Lynn Spencer, "several" facilities picked up the ELT signal around this time. [Lynn Spencer, Touching History: The Untold Story of the Drama That Unfolded in the Skies Over America on 9/11. New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 50.]. 

Peter McCloskey, a traffic management coordinator at the New York Center, later recalled that the ELT had gone off "in the vicinity of Lower Manhattan." [Memorandum for the Record: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center Interview with Peter McCloskey." 9/11 Commission, October 1, 2003].

And, around the time AAL 11 crashed into the WTC North tower, a participant in an FAA teleconference stated, "We got a report of an ELT in the area that (the radar track for Flight 11) was in." (Before it disappeared from radar screens, the track for AAL 11 had indicated the plane was about 20 miles from New York's JFK International Airport). [9/11 Air Traffic Control Transcript] https://www.scribd.com/document/13484898/9-11-Air-Traffic-Control-Transcript 

Additionally, while an ELT went off two minutes before AAL 11 crashed into the WTC, it appears that no ELT went off at the time of the crash itself at 8:46 a.m., as it should have done. Likewise with United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175), which “allegedly” crashed into the South Tower at 9:03 a.m. An ELT signal was transmitted in the New York area four minutes before, at 8:59 a.m. The pilot of Flight 583, who had reported the previous ELT signal, told David Bottiglia at the New York Center that he had noticed another ELT going off. The pilot said, "I hate to keep burdening you with this stuff, but now we're picking up another ELT on 21.5." Again, the same as the previous crash with AAL 11, with the ELT being transmitted four minutes before UAL 175 crashed into the South Tower. Interesting there was no ELT transmission activated at the time of the two crashes themselves, which should have happened.  

Furthermore, there is no evidence cited of any ELTs reported for American Airlines Flight 77 or United Airlines Flight 93 at the times of both crashes. This indicates that none of the four planes listed as being involved on 9/11 crashed at any of the named targets in the official 9/11 narrative.

The ELT activated over Ann Arbor, Michigan at 9:53 a.m.

Interestingly, an ELT was transmitted over Ann Arbor in Michigan at 13:53 p.m. PST, 9:53 a.m. EST. This ELT has not been officially related to any of the four alleged planes listed on 9/11. However, according to this evidence it indicates that a plane crashed in Ann Arbor at 9:53 a.m., but has never been accounted for or addressed by the authorities. Note, in the communication between the two controllers it appears there is an audio drop-out, or has been editing done, just after when the controller says "wait that doesn't make sense", and the other controller replies "yes it does, it... (audio drops-out or is edited)". The controller seems to go on to explain something to the other controller, however there's an audio drop-out or edit towards the end? Why was this information omitted? What was being concealed about this ELT occurrence?


Does this indicate that ELTs were being falsely transmitted which were part of the many military war games training exercises taking place on 9/11, where simulated scenarios of plane hijackings were taking place. The Ann Arbor ELT could explain why ELTs were being transmitted too early in the case of AAL 11 and UAL 175, ahead of their alleged crashes?
       
The official ELT evidence alone implies that none of the four planes crashed at their targets. The evidence of ELT signals being transmitted in the New York area before the World Trade Center towers were hit raises serious questions about the official plane’s narrative on 9/11. If ELTs had been activated, this should have been at the times the airplanes crashed into the towers and not several minutes beforehand. But while a number of Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) mentioned the ELT signals in their interviews with the 9/11 Commission, the 9/11 Commission Report offered no explanation for these discrepancies. For example, where the sources of the ELT signals originated from? Or were they from somewhere else? And were the ELT transmitters themselves ever found? After all, according to the FAA, "In most installations the [ELT] is attached to the aircraft structure as far as practicable in the fuselage; or in the tail surface, in such a manner that damage to the beacon will be minimized in the event of a crash impact.
http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgNPRM.nsf/0/ae86aa83c819fdbd86256819006c1c0f!OpenDocument

What we can determine from all the available evidence is, no ELT transmissions were activated at any of the four plane crash impacts on 9/11, which is what should have happened.

Update: Feb 2024

This is document is from the 9/11 Commission investigation files, in relation to an ELT being manually triggered. According to the Commission document, and their experienced pilot testimony of Paul Thumser, ELTs cannot be manually triggered in Boeing 767s.



This is damming evidence, because AA11 which is a Boeing 767 triggered an ELT two minutes too early before it allegedly crashed into the North Tower, which is impossible, but also even more seriously damaging is, there was no ELT at the point of the impact of the plane into the North Tower, where the ELT should have been activated. Also, UA175, which was also a Boeing 767, also triggered an ELT four minutes too early before it allegedly crashed into the South Tower, which again is impossible, and also did not activate an ELT at the point of impact into the South Tower either, which should have happened. Just to add, neither AA77 or UA93 which were Boeing 757s, triggered any ELT either before or at the points of impact which is highly questionable, and seriously damaging for the official plane narratives of the four planes. This calls into question all four plane crash stories, but also indicates that none of the four planes named by authorities crashed into the named targets. Something else took place instead with these four events. The evidence points to this conclusion. 


Friday, 28 December 2018

The NORAD tapes are proof 'Delta 89' was not 'Delta 1989' on 9/11


Three minutes after the Pentagon was hit, a strange aircraft with call sign "Delta 89" popped up on the radar screens of air defence Commander Kevin Nasypany's crew. It signaled a hijacking and was tracked by NEADS for three minutes before it suddenly disappeared again.

In the “official” story, Delta 89 doesn't exist. Better to say, for the 9/11 Commission as well as authors Michael Bronner and Lynn Spencer ("Touching History"), the plane tracked by NEADS as Delta 89 was in fact Delta 1989, and nothing more than a case of sloppy communication, however, this is impossible. It is easy to show that, apart from the different call sign, Delta 89's transponder code, flight plan and flight path differed from Delta 1989. The evidence is present on the NORAD tapes, a source of impeccable authenticity because you can virtually look over the shoulder of NEADS technicians while they're tracking Delta 89 on their displays. 

To demonstrate why Delta 89 was not identical with Delta 1989, I shall go through the NORAD tapes step by step and comment on them, however before starting the analysis, we need to get a rough understanding how NEADS radar works, as it is quite different from the FAA radar. Lynn Spencer explains in her book "Touching History" (Pg.32).

Slow and cumbersome, and not nearly as user friendly as more modern equipment, the NEADS monochromic radar displays are not designed to take internal FAA radar data or to identify radar tracks originating from inside the United States. The system offers little, if any, such low-level coverage over the country.

Their radar scopes are filled with hundreds of radar returns not just from aircraft but from weather systems, ground interference. and what's called anomalous propagation - false returns caused by conditions in the atmosphere, or by such obstruction as flocks of birds.

So the NEADS radar screen is filled with countless radar blips from planes - without the identifying data block common to FAA radar, however - as well as irregular radar returns. Only on special occasions like emergency cases, a plane's blip is highlighted and provided with a data tag. Lynn Spencer (Pg. 25/26).
 
Pilots have three special transponder codes that they can dial in: 7500 for hijacking, 7600 for loss of radio, and 7700 for other emergencies. Any of them will cause the airplane's tag to light up on his radar screen, but he doesn't see any such tag.

Now we are ready to start with the analysis. The complete transcripts are here. It is highly recommended to listen to the "original" audio file of the following channels (scroll forward to the respective time).

Channel 4   - 1:14:00
Channel 7   - 1:09:00
Channel 21 - 1:09:00

(Channel 7)
 
9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked aircraft Delta nineteen eighty-nine. I give you the code 1304, presently due south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350. Where did it take-off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that if you want to get someone up.

90 seconds before Delta 89 appears on stage, NEADS receives a verbal message from Colin Scoggins, the military liaison controller at Boston Center, regarding Delta 1989. The message is affirmed with professional calm. NEADS knows now that one of the many anonymous radar blips near Cleveland is a possible hijack. Note that Scoggins is wrong on the destination of Delta 1989: that was Los Angeles, not Las Vegas.
  
(Channel 4)
 
9:41:00 - Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack, south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now

9:41:05 - Good! Pick it up! Find it!

9:41:05 - Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:13 - Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one - same place - Las Vegas

In striking contrast to Delta 1989, the appearance of Delta 89 causes big excitement among the NEADS crew. It is echoed through all of the channels. Lynn Spencer interprets this passage as a prompt reaction to Scoggins's message, but there are several reasons why this cannot be the case.

The different call sign: needless to say, transmitting the correct call sign of an aircraft is an absolute must in aeronautic communication. No air traffic controller would ever get the idea to abbreviate a flight number by omitting the first two digits because that will automatically lead to massive confusion.

"We have a code on him now" - obviously, the plane has squawked a special emergency code that causes its blip to lighten up on the NEADS radar displays - just as explained above. This is immediately noticed by the NEADS crew and leads to their excited reactions. The data tag informs them about the call sign (Delta 89), the flight plan (Boston-Las Vegas), the type of the plane (Boeing 767) and the cause of the emergency: a hijacking.

"Another one - same place - Las Vegas" - NEADS is already aware of Delta 1989 which was reported 90 seconds ago by Colin Scoggins. Now Delta 89 - "another one" - appears in the same vicinity. So NEADS does not identify Delta 89 with Delta 1989, but views it as a different plane. Delta 89's blip suddenly flashes on the NEADS screens - making it easy to follow - and indicates a hijacking. In contrast, Delta 1989's blip is not spotted yet. 
 
(Channel 21)

9:41:05 - Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going to Las Vegas - another one

9:41:30  - As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53

9:41:35  - 288 for 92 miles search only

9:41:46 - I have a 280 for 97
 
9:41:58 - I have a 287 for 97

9:42:23 - The two really close together. One used - one has a code of 7112 - the one we are next to him

To understand what's going on here, I cite Lynn Spencer again (Pg. 32).

To identify American 11, the surveillance and ID techs must go through a gruelling process. The technicians must first determine which radar data on their screens is for aircraft, which they do by monitoring its movement, which is distinctive for planes. The technician must observe for at least 36 seconds to a minute just to confirm that a blip is in fact an aircraft track. The tech must attach what's called a tactical display number to it, which tells the computer to start tracking and identifying the target. If the target is in fact a plane, then over a period of 12-20 seconds, the computer will start to generate information on the track: heading, speed, latitude, longitude, and the identifying information being transmitted by the transponder.

The NEADS technicians start a "search" for Delta 89, described by Lynn Spencer as a gruelling process. But in contrast to American 11, which had turned the transponder off, Delta 89 is tagged, enabling them to curtail the procedure. In the course of the search, they detect two planes "really close together" - Delta 89 and Delta 1989 -, and obtain the squawk code of one of them: 7112. This is not Delta 1989's code, which is 1304, so it must be the code of Delta 89. The first digit "7" indicates that it's not the ID code of a usual civilian airliner - they never begin with a 7. Instead, the 7 is reserved for emergency cases like 7500, 7600, or 7700. By squawking 7112, Delta 89 manages to pop up on the NEADS radar screens and signals a hijacking.

(Channel 4)

9:42:43 - Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do have contact. ((Repeats information)).

9:43:04 - I give you a Lat-Long if you need that. Go ahead. 4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now, but he's a confirmed hijack

9:43:16 - (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar, Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.

9:43:35 - (Indianapolis Center) Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X. L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay, cause we don't show him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.

Now NEADS contacts Indianapolis Center to inform them that Delta 89 is heading for their airspace. This is evidence that Delta 89 is flying southwest- or southbound at that point because the boundary to Indianapolis Center runs 40 miles south of Cleveland. In contrast, Delta 1989 never goes south, and especially at 9:43, it is flying westbound (direction 285) according to the Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 transcript:

9:40:57 - (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly heading two eight five

9:41:00 - (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty nine

The next radio transmission between Cleveland Center and Delta 1989 occurs at 9:44am. In between, there is no order to change the direction, which is proof that Delta 1989 is not heading towards Indianapolis Center at 9:43am like Delta 89 (according to Stacia Rountree from NEADS). 
 
Back to NEADS:

(Channel 4)

9:44:03 - Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!

(Channel 21)

9:46:25 - (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304 squawk this time

9:46:53 - The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then

At 9:44, Delta 89 is suddenly "lost". NEADS doesn't know where it's gone and is unable to track it. Obviously the pilot has turned off the transponder, making himself virtually invisible. The radar technicians resume the search. At 9:46:25, they are able to identify an eligible blip, but it's Delta 1989 this time. Their comment: "that's not the guy then" - the 7112 guy they lost and were looking for.

Now it's time to sum up the data:


Did the 9/11 Commission overlook these discrepancies? Unlikely. Did Commission staffers not check Channel 21 with the "code 7112" message? Oh yes, they did! On January 23, 2004, Miles Kara, Kevin Schaeffer, and Geoffrey Brown interviewed Sgt. Susan Marie Rose, whose voice is recorded on Channel 21 as she spots "code 7112":

Commission staff asked Rose is she recalled details on tracking Delta Airlines Flight 1989 or United Airlines Flight 93 (UAL 93). She replied that she and LaMarche tracked a specific suspected hijack that they believe was flight planned from Boston to Las Vegas through Cleveland and Minneapolis Center airspace. This flight, she believed, was headed to a specific airport, and he was manoeuvring to turn into the airport to land.

Rose noted that she is uncertain whether the aircraft reflected in Commission staff's recording was one that was search only or one that was a mode three. She surmised there being two aircraft that they followed based on listening to the tapes in which she pointed out a mode three squawking code 1304. The "surmise" of Susan Marie Rose is certainly correct, but squawk code 7112, evidence for a second plane is simply omitted in the report. Miles Kara and his colleagues don't seem to be interested in this other aircraft, despite the strange code and the fact that it was considered a hijacking. Code 7112 and Delta 89 were simply glossed over.
 
The NORAD tapes belong to the most authentic sources for the events of 9/11, and they are certainly not faked, as everyone will attest who has listened to them. As matters stand, the tapes provide watertight proof that Delta 89 was NOT Delta 1989, Delta 89 being defined as the aircraft that was tracked by NEADS between 9:41 and 9:44.

The analysis must not stop at this point. What kind of plane was this Delta 89? Discarding exotic scenarios like a drunken pilot or a foreign intruder playing games with the air defence, the plane's known attributes allow only one reasonable explanation - Delta 89 was a simulated hijacking as part of a military exercise:

- "Delta 89" was a fake call sign. The regular Delta Airlines Flight 89 was sitting at JFK airport and scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 3:00 p.m.

- The behaviour of Delta 89 reminds of a hide-and-seek game. To facilitate the catcher's job, it left its cover and "cuckooed" for three minutes before disappearing in the dark again. Note that military exercises are often termed "war games".

- Delta 89 didn't squawk 7500, the emergency code for a "real world" hijacking, but another irregular code - 7112 - that was immediately interpreted as a hijacking by NEADS technicians.

- According to FAA directive 7110.65, certain beacon codes are regularly assigned to planes taking part in NORAD exercises - "7112" seems to have been one of them:
     
- NORAD will ensure exercise FAKER aircraft flight plans are filed containing discrete beacon codes from the Department of Defence code allocation specified in FAAO 7610.4, Special Military Operations, Appendix 8. 


Delta 89 fulfils all conditions for an "exercise faker aircraft" whose job was to simulate a hijacking. Alternative explanations are hard to imagine. Therefore it's time now to establish the central thesis of this text: Delta 89 was a faker hijack exercise.

So what - the interested reader might ask - what impact has this insight on the official story of the 9/11 attacks? Indeed, Michael Ruppert has already pointed out the existence of at least one "live-fly exercise" (with real aircraft involved) in his book Crossing the Rubicon. Lynn Spencer notes: 

"Today's training exercise runs a number of scenarios, including a simulated hijacking in which the perpetrators overtake an aircraft for political purposes, directing it to an island in order to seek asylum". (Pg.24) So is the case of "Exercise Delta 89" important at all?

Yes, it is, because of Delta 1989, which was kind of a "doppelganger" plane with nearly identical call sign (promptly leading to confusion), identical aircraft type (Boeing 767), identical origin airport (Boston), and flying in close vicinity when Delta 89 exposed itself at 9:41. Clearly the designation "Delta 89" was carefully chosen by the war-game designers to create a mix-up with Delta 1989. This is the first indication that the on-going exercises interfered with regular civilian air traffic.

In other words: Delta 1989, in spite of being a regular airliner, played a peripheral role in the exercise. It served as a cover-up for Delta 89. At first, NEADS was alerted by Delta 89, and when this plane stopped squawking and disappeared, the attention shifted to Delta 1989, which was closely observed until its landing in Cleveland.

Half an hour after Delta 1989, another mysterious airliner in distress landed at Cleveland Airport. Just like Delta 89, its existence seems to have been covered-up through "merging" it with Delta 1989 - a doppelganger case again. This naturally leads to the question whether the eerie Cleveland plane was identical to Delta 89. Indeed, there are surprising congruences:

- Both planes were reportedly a 767
- Both planes were reportedly coming from Boston
- Both planes were suspected of being hijacked
- Both planes were covered-up by Delta 1989


Thursday, 27 December 2018

The Mysterious United Airlines "Flight 177" On 9/11

By Mark Conlon


On 9/11, Mark Randol was manager of the Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO) in Washington, DC, a subdivision of the FAA. He reported to the Commission.

By 9:25 a.m. Marcus Arroyo (Regional manager) called to report several hijackings, including AAL77, UAL 175 and UAL 177.

He made it clear that this was a terrorist act. Randol then immediately tasked his staff to find out everything they could about the flights. Randol remembers that the whole day was hectic and by 9:45 a.m. they had identified that AAL 77 had departed from Dulles, but they could not confirm whether it had been hijacked, while they discovered that UAL177 was being held at the gate in Boston.

The BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS (BTS) database tells us that UAL 177 was scheduled to depart at 6:55 p.m. from Boston, destination Los Angeles.

This raises two important questions:
  1.     Why was it reported hijacked?
  2.     Why was it reported "held at the gate" if its departure was only in the evening?
Most remarkably, the hijacking of United 177 was reported at 9:25 a.m. two minutes after Ed Ballinger, United flight dispatcher, sent the last message to 'Flight 175' while it was over Pittsburgh.

Research Source: WoodyBox: http://911woodybox.blogspot.com/2009/11/mysterious-united-177-from-boston.html