By Mark Conlon
Three minutes after the Pentagon was hit, a strange aircraft with call sign "Delta 89" popped up on the radar screens of air defence Commander Kevin Nasypany's crew. It signaled a hijacking and was tracked by NEADS for three minutes before it suddenly disappeared again.
In the “official” story, Delta 89 doesn't exist.
Better to
say, for the 9/11 Commission as well as authors Michael Bronner and Lynn
Spencer ("Touching History"), the plane tracked by NEADS as Delta 89
was in
fact Delta 1989, and nothing more than a case of sloppy communication,
however, this is impossible. It is easy to show that, apart
from the different call sign, Delta 89's transponder code, flight plan
and
flight path differed from Delta 1989. The evidence is present on the
NORAD
tapes, a source of impeccable authenticity because you can virtually
look over
the shoulder of NEADS technicians while they're tracking Delta 89 on
their
displays.
To demonstrate why Delta 89 was not identical with
Delta
1989, I shall go through the NORAD tapes step by step and comment on
them, however before starting the analysis, we need to get a rough
understanding how NEADS
radar works, as it is quite different from the FAA radar. Lynn Spencer
explains in
her book "Touching History" (Pg.32).
Slow and cumbersome, and not nearly as user friendly as more
modern equipment, the NEADS monochromic radar displays are not designed to take
internal FAA radar data or to identify radar tracks originating from inside the
United States. The system offers little, if any, such low-level coverage over
the country.
Their radar scopes are filled with hundreds of radar returns
not just from aircraft but from weather systems, ground interference. and what's
called anomalous propagation - false returns caused by conditions in the
atmosphere, or by such obstruction as flocks of birds.
So the NEADS radar screen is filled with countless radar
blips from planes - without the identifying data block common to FAA radar,
however - as well as irregular radar returns. Only on special occasions like
emergency cases, a plane's blip is highlighted and provided with a data tag.
Lynn Spencer (Pg. 25/26).
Pilots have three special transponder codes that they can
dial in: 7500 for hijacking, 7600 for loss of radio, and 7700 for other
emergencies. Any of them will cause the airplane's tag to light up on his radar
screen, but he doesn't see any such tag.
Now we are ready to start with the analysis. The complete transcripts are here. It is highly recommended to listen to the "original" audio file of the following channels (scroll forward to the respective time).
Channel 4 - 1:14:00
Channel 7 - 1:09:00
Channel 21 - 1:09:00
(Channel 7)
9:39:31 Colin Scoggins, Boston Center military. Hijacked
aircraft Delta nineteen eighty-nine. I give you the code 1304, presently due
south of Cleveland, heading westbound, destination Las Vegas. And is this one a
hijack, Sir? We believe it is. Didn't it squawk hijack? We don't umm...I don't
know - it's squawking 1304 if you want to crank him up. 767, altitude 350.
Where did it take-off? Out of Boston. We're trying to get a tail number on that
if you want to get someone up.
90 seconds before Delta 89 appears on stage, NEADS receives
a verbal message from Colin Scoggins, the military liaison controller at Boston
Center, regarding Delta 1989. The message is affirmed with professional calm.
NEADS knows now that one of the many anonymous radar blips near Cleveland is a
possible hijack. Note that Scoggins is wrong on the destination of Delta 1989:
that was Los Angeles, not Las Vegas.
(Channel 4)
9:41:00 - Delta 89 is a hijack, they think it's a hijack,
south of Cleveland, we have a code on him now
9:41:05 - Good! Pick it up! Find it!
9:41:05 - Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going
to Las Vegas - another one
9:41:13 - Eight-nine. Boeing 767 Boston-Las Vegas. Another one
- same place - Las Vegas
In striking contrast to Delta 1989, the appearance of Delta
89 causes big excitement among the NEADS crew. It is echoed through all of the
channels. Lynn Spencer interprets this passage as a prompt reaction to
Scoggins's message, but there are several reasons why this cannot be the case.
The different call sign: needless to say, transmitting the correct call sign of an aircraft is an absolute must in aeronautic communication. No air traffic controller would ever get the idea to abbreviate a flight number by omitting the first two digits because that will automatically lead to massive confusion.
The different call sign: needless to say, transmitting the correct call sign of an aircraft is an absolute must in aeronautic communication. No air traffic controller would ever get the idea to abbreviate a flight number by omitting the first two digits because that will automatically lead to massive confusion.
"We have a code on him now" - obviously, the plane
has squawked a special emergency code that causes its blip to lighten up on the
NEADS radar displays - just as explained above. This is immediately noticed by
the NEADS crew and leads to their excited reactions. The data tag informs them
about the call sign (Delta 89), the flight plan (Boston-Las Vegas), the type of
the plane (Boeing 767) and the cause of the emergency: a hijacking.
"Another one - same place - Las Vegas" - NEADS is
already aware of Delta 1989 which was reported 90 seconds ago by Colin
Scoggins. Now Delta 89 - "another one" - appears in the same
vicinity. So NEADS does not identify Delta 89 with Delta 1989, but views it as
a different plane. Delta 89's blip suddenly flashes on the NEADS
screens - making it easy to follow - and indicates a hijacking. In contrast,
Delta 1989's blip is not spotted yet.
(Channel 21)
9:41:05 - Another one. I hear someone going from Boston going
to Las Vegas - another one
9:41:30 - As before is one missing. Start a search. Range 53
9:41:35 - 288 for 92 miles search only
9:41:46 - I have a 280 for 97
9:41:58 - I have a 287 for 97
9:42:23 - The two really close together. One used - one has a
code of 7112 - the one we are next to him
To understand what's going on here, I cite Lynn Spencer again
(Pg. 32).
To identify American 11, the surveillance and ID techs must
go through a gruelling process. The technicians must first determine
which radar data on their screens is for aircraft, which they do by monitoring
its movement, which is distinctive for planes. The technician must observe for
at least 36 seconds to a minute just to confirm that a blip is in fact an
aircraft track. The tech must attach what's called a tactical display number to
it, which tells the computer to start tracking and identifying the target. If
the target is in fact a plane, then over a period of 12-20 seconds, the
computer will start to generate information on the track: heading, speed,
latitude, longitude, and the identifying information being transmitted by the
transponder.
The NEADS technicians start a "search" for Delta
89, described by Lynn Spencer as a gruelling process. But in contrast to
American 11, which had turned the transponder off, Delta 89 is tagged, enabling
them to curtail the procedure. In the course of the search, they detect two
planes "really close together" - Delta 89 and Delta 1989 -, and
obtain the squawk code of one of them: 7112. This is not Delta 1989's code,
which is 1304, so it must be the code of Delta 89. The first digit "7"
indicates that it's not the ID code of a usual civilian airliner - they never
begin with a 7. Instead, the 7 is reserved for emergency cases like 7500, 7600,
or 7700. By squawking 7112, Delta 89 manages to pop up on the NEADS radar
screens and signals a hijacking.
(Channel 4)
9:42:43 - Indy Center? Indianapolis Center: Delta eight-nine
have you information on that aircraft? I want to give you a heads-up. This is
another hijacked aircraft, Boston to Las Vegas with a Mode 3 of 1304. We do
have contact. ((Repeats information)).
9:43:04 - I give you a Lat-Long if you need that. Go ahead.
4121 North 08215 West. I'll give you a heads-up that's all we have right now,
but he's a confirmed hijack
9:43:16 - (Indianapolis Center) We don't show him in our
system at this point - you are tracking him, you say? We have him on the radar,
Sir - he's headed your way. He's headed our way, okay.
9:43:35 - (Indianapolis Center) Boston to L-A-S, right? L-A-X.
L-A-X? I've got Vegas, Sir, whatever Vegas says. L-A-S, okay, Las Vegas. Okay,
cause we don't show him in the system anywhere. Do you have Mode 3 capability
or anything? He's on a 1304 code? Okay, we bring that up.
Now NEADS contacts Indianapolis Center to inform them that
Delta 89 is heading for their airspace. This is evidence that Delta 89 is flying
southwest- or southbound at that point because the boundary to Indianapolis
Center runs 40 miles south of Cleveland. In contrast, Delta 1989 never goes
south, and especially at 9:43, it is flying westbound (direction 285) according
to the Cleveland Center/Delta 1989 transcript:
9:40:57 - (Lorain Radar) delta nineteen eighty nine fly
heading two eight five
9:41:00 - (Delta 1989) two eight five delta nineteen eighty
nine
The next radio transmission between Cleveland Center and
Delta 1989 occurs at 9:44am. In between, there is no order to change the
direction, which is proof that Delta 1989 is not heading towards Indianapolis
Center at 9:43am like Delta 89 (according to Stacia Rountree from NEADS).
Back to NEADS:
(Channel 4)
9:44:03 - Where did it go? Somebody dropped the aircraft. Who
dropped the aircraft? I DON'T KNOW!
(Channel 21)
9:46:25 - (?)52 on a 49 for 59 miles searching. We got a 1304
squawk this time
9:46:53 - The 1304 guy. That's not the guy then
At 9:44, Delta 89 is suddenly "lost". NEADS
doesn't know where it's gone and is unable to track it. Obviously the pilot has
turned off the transponder, making himself virtually invisible. The radar
technicians resume the search. At 9:46:25, they are able to identify an
eligible blip, but it's Delta 1989 this time. Their comment: "that's not
the guy then" - the 7112 guy they lost and were looking for.
Now it's time to sum up the data:
Did the 9/11 Commission overlook these discrepancies? Unlikely. Did Commission staffers not check Channel 21 with the "code 7112" message? Oh yes, they did! On January 23, 2004, Miles Kara, Kevin Schaeffer, and Geoffrey Brown interviewed Sgt. Susan Marie Rose, whose voice is recorded on Channel 21 as she spots "code 7112":
Commission staff asked Rose is she recalled details on
tracking Delta Airlines Flight 1989 or United Airlines Flight 93 (UAL 93). She
replied that she and LaMarche tracked a specific suspected hijack that they
believe was flight planned from Boston to Las Vegas through Cleveland and
Minneapolis Center airspace. This flight, she believed, was headed to a
specific airport, and he was manoeuvring to turn into the airport to land.
Rose noted that she is uncertain whether the aircraft
reflected in Commission staff's recording was one that was search only or one
that was a mode three. She surmised there being two aircraft that they followed
based on listening to the tapes in which she pointed out a mode three squawking
code 1304. The "surmise" of Susan Marie Rose is certainly
correct, but squawk code 7112, evidence for a second plane is simply omitted
in the report. Miles Kara and his colleagues don't seem to be interested in
this other aircraft, despite the strange code and the fact that it was
considered a hijacking. Code 7112 and Delta 89 were simply glossed over.
The NORAD tapes belong to the most authentic sources for the
events of 9/11, and they are certainly not faked, as everyone will attest who
has listened to them. As matters stand, the tapes provide watertight proof that
Delta 89 was NOT Delta 1989, Delta 89 being defined as the aircraft that was
tracked by NEADS between 9:41 and 9:44.
The analysis must not stop at this point. What kind of plane
was this Delta 89? Discarding exotic scenarios like a drunken pilot or a
foreign intruder playing games with the air defence, the plane's known
attributes allow only one reasonable explanation - Delta 89 was a simulated
hijacking as part of a military exercise:
- "Delta 89" was a fake call sign. The regular
Delta Airlines Flight 89 was sitting at JFK airport and scheduled to depart for
Los Angeles at 3:00 p.m.
- The behaviour of Delta 89 reminds of a hide-and-seek game.
To facilitate the catcher's job, it left its cover and "cuckooed" for
three minutes before disappearing in the dark again. Note that military
exercises are often termed "war games".
- Delta 89 didn't squawk 7500, the emergency code for a
"real world" hijacking, but another irregular code - 7112 - that was
immediately interpreted as a hijacking by NEADS technicians.
- According to FAA directive 7110.65, certain beacon codes
are regularly assigned to planes taking part in NORAD exercises -
"7112" seems to have been one of them:
- NORAD will ensure
exercise FAKER aircraft flight plans are filed containing discrete beacon codes
from the Department of Defence code allocation specified in FAAO 7610.4,
Special Military Operations, Appendix 8.
Delta 89 fulfils all conditions for an "exercise faker
aircraft" whose job was to simulate a hijacking. Alternative explanations
are hard to imagine. Therefore it's time now to establish the central thesis of
this text: Delta 89 was a faker hijack exercise.
So what - the interested reader might ask - what impact has
this insight on the official story of the 9/11 attacks? Indeed, Michael Ruppert
has already pointed out the existence of at least one "live-fly
exercise" (with real aircraft involved) in his book Crossing the Rubicon.
Lynn Spencer notes:
"Today's training exercise runs a number of scenarios,
including a simulated hijacking in which the perpetrators overtake an aircraft
for political purposes, directing it to an island in order to seek
asylum". (Pg.24) So is the case of "Exercise Delta 89" important
at all?
Yes, it is, because of Delta 1989, which was kind of a
"doppelganger" plane with nearly identical call sign (promptly
leading to confusion), identical aircraft type (Boeing 767), identical origin
airport (Boston), and flying in close vicinity when Delta 89 exposed itself at 9:41.
Clearly the designation "Delta 89" was carefully chosen by the
war-game designers to create a mix-up with Delta 1989. This is the first
indication that the on-going exercises interfered with regular civilian air
traffic.
In other words: Delta 1989, in spite of being a regular
airliner, played a peripheral role in the exercise. It served as a cover-up for
Delta 89. At first, NEADS was alerted by Delta 89, and when this plane stopped
squawking and disappeared, the attention shifted to Delta 1989, which was
closely observed until its landing in Cleveland.
Half an hour after Delta 1989, another mysterious airliner
in distress landed at Cleveland Airport. Just like Delta 89, its existence
seems to have been covered-up through "merging" it with Delta 1989 -
a doppelganger case again. This naturally leads to the question whether the
eerie Cleveland plane was identical to Delta 89. Indeed, there are surprising congruences:
- Both planes were reportedly a 767
- Both planes were reportedly coming from Boston
- Both planes were suspected of being hijacked
- Both planes were covered-up by Delta 1989
